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ADmIlALTY-AFFEIGHTMENT CoNTRACrs-IcoMPLTE VOYAGn-.NA-
TIONAL STEAm NAVIGATION Co. v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER Co. (MARCH 13,
1917) C. C. A. (2D. Cn.) OCT. TERm, 1916, No. 2o4.-The respondent
entered into an agreement with the libellant to ship paper to Greece on
the latter's steamer and to prepay the freight in New York. The
respondent having filled out the bills of lading, delivered them to the
libellant for its signature. The ship sailed before the respondent took
up the bills of lading and paid the freight When one day out, fire was
discovered and the ship and cargo became a total loss. The respondent,
having refused to pay the freight, this libel was filed to recover the same
by virtue of certain provisions in the bill of lading which stipulated that
the prepaid freight was "wholly due upon receipt of the goods into the
custody" of the libellant, or on the signing of the bills of lading, "the
ship lost or not lost" Held, that the libellant could recover the full
amount of the freight
The American courts have not followed the law of England to the
effect that freight prepaid by agreement cannot be recovered by the
shipper and can be collected by the ship-owner in case of the loss of
the goods, the rule being set out in the leading case of Byrne v. Schiller
(1871) i Asp. Mar. L. Cas. Ii. On the contrary, the general principle
of our maritime law is that a contract for the conveyance of goods on a
voyage is an entire contract, and unless it be completely performed by
the delivery of the goods at the place of destination, no freight whatever
is due Mitsui et al. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (I913) 202 Fed.
26; cf. Sieveking, The German Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea, p. 293.
For this reason, freight paid in advance can be recovered in the event
of the non-completion of the voyage. The Schooner Arthur B. (1go1)
i Alaska, 403; Chase v. Alliance Ins. Co. (1864) 9 Allen (Mass.) 311.
Exceptions to this rule may be made by mutual consent, and such an
agreement may act as a waiver of any right of recovery for the uncom-
pleted voyage. The Tornado (1882) bS U. S. 342; Griggs v. Austin
(825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 20. It seems to follow that the 
parties may
stipulate that the freight shall be prepaid and become wholly due without
right of recovery in the case of the loss of the ship, thus in effect, by
agreement incorporating the English doctrine. Portland Flouring Mills
Co. v. British & F. M. Ins. Co. (I9o4) i3o Fed. 86o. And by "wholly
due" would be meant a present liability to pay or "payable." Yocum
Admr'v. Allen (1898) 58 Oh. St 28o; Cutter v. Perkins (i859) 47 Me.
557. The respondent's duty became affixed, therefore, prior to the loss
of the ship and cargo.
A. S. B.
CAwaEas-CARIAGE OF GOODs-LImITATION OF LIABIITY.-HEuMAN V.
M. H. PowEas Co. (I916) 162 N. Y. S. 59o-The plaintiff made a con-
tract with the defendant, a general truckaan, to remove some household
effects. The liability of the truckman was fixed at $5o for the loss of any
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article together with its contents. It did not appear that the considera-
tion for such limitation of liability was a lower rate for cartage. One
night, while the van containing the plaintiff's safe was in the defendant's
storehouse, some of his employees stole valuable jewelry from the safe.
Held, that the shipper could not recover more than the stipulated sum
of $5o. Smith and McLaughlin, JJ., dissenting.
It has been established as a general rule that the common-law liability
of carriers as insurers may be reasonably limited by an agreement.
Ranchau v. Rutland R. R. Co. (1898) 71 Vt I42; Wells v. Gt. Northern
Ry. Co. (I911) 59 Or. 165; Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Hopkins (1868) 41
Ala. 486. In some states a contrary holding is required by statute.
Davis v. Chicago, R. L and P. R. Co. (18gi) 83 Ia. 744. Ordinarily it
has been held contrary to public policy to permit a carrier to contract
for exemption from the consequences of its own negligence or that of
its servants or agents. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood (1873) I7 Wall.
(U. S.) 357; Welch v. Boston & A. R. R. Co. (1874) 41 Conn. 333;
Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co. v. Beasley (igo6) io4 Va. 788. A few
jurisdictions have qualified this sound doctrine by peculiar holdings. In
New York a distinction is drawn between negligence of the carrier
itself, and negligence of its servants, allowing it to contract against
the latter but not against the former. French v. Buffalo, N. Y. & E.
R. R. Co. (1868) 43 N. Y. Io8. Later cases go farther, and allow a
carrier generally to contract even against its own negligence, if its
intention is clearly and explicitly expressed. Lynch v. N. Y. Cent. &
H. R. R. Co. (915) 153 N. Y. S. 633; -Jennings v. Grand Trunk R. R.
Co. (i8gi) 127 N. Y. 438. But in these cases the shipper is given the
choice of declaring the value of his goods, and paying a higher rate for
greater protection, or of accepting a lower rate and lower liability.
Such a modification of the general negligence rule seems to be wellrecognized. Rose v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co. (9o7) 35 Mont 7o;
Mobile & 0. R. R. Co. v. Hopkins, supra. The principal case is a decided
extension of the rule, for there the contract did not show that the con-
sideration for the valuation at a fixed sum was a lower freight rate.
No choice was given. The dissenting judges argued that as there was
no such choice and as rates were not fixed on the value of the goods,
the carrier should not be relieved from full liability. The same rules
of public policy which apply in the negligence cases would secm to apply
even more strongly in this case. Such contracts are not favored even by
the New York courts. It is submitted that the dissenting opinion presents
the stronger view.
S. J. T.
CARRIERS-PASSENGERS-PERSON BOARDING MOVING CAR WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF CONDUCTOR.-BERKEBILE V. JOHNSTOwiq TRACTOiN Co.
(1917) 99 ATL. (PA.) 87i.-Without the knowledge of the motorman or
the conductor the plaintiff claimed to have boarded a moving trolley car
of the defendant, intending to pay his fare. Before he had paid his fare,
the car was struck by another car and the plaintiff was injured. Held, that
a nonsuit was wrongly directed, and that the question of whether or not
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the plaintiff was a passenger should have been submitted to the jury
with proper instructions.
The authorities declare that in order to create the relation of carrier.
and passenger, there must be an offer by the person to take passage
and an acceptance of him by the carrier. Hogner v. Boston El. R. Co.
(i9o8) 198 Mass. 26o; Devine v. Chi. City Ry. Co. (igii) 162 Il. App.
243. But the acceptance may be implied from slight circumstances.
Kane v. Cicero Proviso Electric Ry. Co. (i9o2) oo IIl. App. i8. If the
car slows down in response to a signal from a bystander and the car is
boarded while in motion, the one so boarding is a passenger and may
recover for an injury then received because of the negligence of the
company. O'Mara v. St. Louis Transit Co. (i9o3) io2 Mo. App. 202;
Nolan v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (913) 25o Mo. 6o2. The act of
stopping a car at a customary place is an implied acceptance of those
waiting to enter. Hull v. Terre Haute Electric Co. (i9o5) 38 Ind. App.
43. Under such circumstances it is not necessary that the party should
be seen. An effort has been made to distinguish such a case from one
where a moving car is boarded without the knowledge of the company
on the ground that it would be impossible to recognize all who might
desire to enter. Schepers v. Union Depot Ry. Co. (i895) 126 Mo. 665.
In the principal case the entry was made when the car was in motion
and without the knowledge of the conductor, with the intention of pay-
ing the fare. If we adopt the fiction that stopping the car is an invita-
tion to enter, we might carry it one step farther and hold that running
cars through the city streets carries a similar invitation, provided a safe
entrance is made and there are no rules of the company against getting
on while the car is moving. Public policy dictates that the plaintiff
should be considered a passenger and not a trespasser, the only
alternatives, even though this is accomplished with some loss to strictly
logical analysis. J.E.H.
CHATTEL MoRGAGEs-RENEWAL-NovAToN-Loss oF Piuo1TY.-Foy-
ADAMS Co. v. SMrrH (1917) 9i S. E. (GA. App.) 24 2 .- The plaintiff
company sold certain chattels to one Tatum taking his purchase money,
note for the amount due, by the terms of which title was reserved in
the plaintiff until payment of the debt. At a later date more chattels
were sold to Tatum, the old note was cancelled and a new note taken
covering both the amount of the old note and the value of the new
purchase, title to all the chattels being expressly reserved in the plaintiff.
Between the dates of the two notes the defendant became a purchaser for
value of part of the property covered by the original note. For the
conversion of that part the plaintiff brought this action. Held, that there
was a novation which divested the title of the plaintiff as against the
defendant.
Conditional sales of chattels have been frequently considered as chattel
mortgages, at least in their general effect. Williston, Sales, sec. 579;
Mechem, Sales, sec. 578. It is the generally accepted rule that a new
mortgage on the same property and on generally the same terms as a
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former mortgage is not a novation and does not forfeit priority as to inter-vening mortgagees or purchasers with notice. Howard v. First NationalBank of Hutchinson (189o) 44 Kan. 549; Hardin v. Elkus (x898) 24 Nev.329. This rule was recognized by the Georgia court. It is clear that thevendor could have preserved his position and precedence by keeping thetwo transactions separate, a mortgage for each. Shall he be penalized formerging the two without otherwise changing the terms of either? Theoutstanding objection to permittirig it seems to be that such permissionmight sanction wilful "sweetening" of poor security by combining it withgood security in one later mortgage at the expense of an intermediatemortgagee. The answer to such an objection in the absence of fraudis probably found by holding the property conveyed to the sub-vendeesubject only to the encumbrance which it originally bore-the same aswould have continued if no renewal had been granted. Mayers v. McNeese(19o2) 71 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 68. But after all, a conditional sale isnot strictly a chattel mortgage. Williston, Sales, sec. 337; Nichols v.Ashton (1892) 155 Mass. 205; Puett v. Edwards (I915) 17 Ga. App. 645.And especially is this distinction to be noted since Georgia by statutethrows the risk of loss upon a conditional vendor, contrary to the generalrule. Ga. Code, sec. 4123; Williston, Sales, secs. 303-304. If the vendorbears this added burden, he might reasonably expect some compensatingadvantages. In the principal case the authorities cited by the court wereall concerned with chattel mortgages, and in view of the facts above men-tioned, it is submitted that these are not entirely in point. A brief analysisof a conditional sale it is believed will cast some light on the case. Thepurchaser gets among other things a power to divest the title of thevendor upon payment of the notes. The purchaser from the vendee,taking with notice, does not get legal title but does obtain a similarpower to acquire title. It is difficult to see where, aside from fraud, hestands in a more favored position than the original vendee. If, then,the novation in the principal case is regarded as a sufficient performanceof the condition of payment to divest the title of the vendor in thatportion of the chattels which were resold, why would it not affectthe whole lot in the same way? And if the title was ever divested, bywhat means was it restored to the original vendor? The intention ofthe parties as expressed by the contract was that title was reserved inthe vendor, and this language is hardly susceptible of the interpretationthat it was intended to pass and re-pass title as in a mortgage transaction.On the other hand, the result arrived at in the Texas case, supra, canprobably be reached here without distorting the real intention of theparties. It would seem that the vendee could not, without actually pay-ing the debt, transfer good title to his sub-vendee nor release the chattelsfrom the condition precedent, but that he could and did place beyondhis own power the possibility of further incumbering the particularchattels in which he had parted with all his interest.
M. S. B.
CONTRACrs-AssIGNMENT-pERFORafANcE.TiEE 
ROSENTHAL PAPER Cov. THE NATIONAL FOLDING BOX AND PAPER CO. (1917) 56 N. Y. L. J.1439.-The plaintiff's assignor, the sole owner of a patent, agreed to give
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the defendant a license to manufacture and sell the patented article
within a specified time and territory, covenanting to "faithfully protect"
against infringements. The defendant was to pay pro rata royalties on
the number sold, the amount of which was to total a certain minimum
sum per annum. During the specified time the patent and contract were
assigned to plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for a deficit of the minimum sum.
The defendant proved infringements. Held, that the contract was personal
to the plaintiff's assignor and not assignable, and that by the assignment
the assignor rendered the further performance of the agreement to protect
the defendant impossible, and thereby discharged the defendant as to
minimum royalties.
When personal performance is the essence of a contract, that is, a
condition precedent to the assignor's rights, the contract cannot be
assigned, and performance by the assignee will not enable him to
enforce the rights. Brit. Wag. Co. v. Lea &' Co. (188o) 5 Q. B. D. 149;
Robson v. Drummond (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 303. Where personal performance
is not the essence of the contract, that is, where it is not a condition
precedent, the contract can be assigned and performance by the assignee
will enable him to enforce the rights. Sears v. Conover (1866) 3 Key.
(N. Y.) 113; Tyler v. Barrows (1868) 6 Rob. (N. Y.) lO4. If the
assignor's duty is such that his executor or administrator would be bound
to perform it, then it is not personal, and a vicarious performance would
be a fulfilment of conditions and would enable the assignee to enforce
the rights. Devlin v. Mayor (1875) 63 N. Y. 8, 16; Woods v. Ridley
(1854) 27 Miss. 119; White v. Commonwealth (1861) 39 Pa. St. 167.
An assignment does not free the assignor from his liabilities and duties
and impose them solely on the assignee. Arkansas Valley Smelting Co.
v. Belden Min. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 379. But if the assignee undertakes
to enforce the right given to him by the assignor, he must show that all
conditions precedent to the existence of such right have been performed
either by the assignor or by himself. Tolerton & Stetson Co. v. Anglo
Cal. Bank (I901) 112 Ia. 706; Atlantic N. C. R. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C.
R. R. Co. (i9o8) 147 N. C. 368; Rockwell v. Edgcomb (1913) 72 Wash.
694. Hence, it is submitted that the decision in the principal case is
correct, there being no performance on the part of either assignee or
assignor of the conditions precedent to the right to royalties. F. C. H.
CONTRACTs-CoNDITIONS PRECEDENT AND SUBSEQUENT-BuRDEN OF
PROoF.-DAVID V. CITY NATIONAL SEcuaTIEs COMPANY (I916) I61
N. Y. S. I74.-A assigned to the defendant certain accounts to be col-
lected by the latter and paid over to third parties. If a certain event
took place the defendant was then to reassign to A except that he was
not to reassign unless the said third parties performed according to
other conditions named in the agreement The plaintiff received an
assignment of the same accounts from A, and in this action sought to
force the defendant to transfer them to him. He alleged generally that
all conditions had been performed. Held, that the conditions were condi-
tions subsequent and should have been pleaded and proved by the
defendant.
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A condition precedent is a condition which must be performed before
a liability arises. Van Buskirk v. Kuhns (913) 164 Cal. 472. This case
also affirms the well-established rule that a condition precedent must be
averred and proved by the plaintiff. A condition subsequent is a con-
dition which is to be performed subsequent to the creation of the liability.
Cf. Semmes v. Hartford Insurance Co. (i8gi) 13 Wall. (U. S.) 158. The
burden of proving a condition subsequent is on the defendant. In
many cases the courts have apparently mistaken a condition precedent
for a condition subsequent. Typical of this class of cases are, Gray v.
Gardner et al. (1871) 17 Mass. 188; Moody Insurance Company (1894)
52 Oh. St 12; Williams v. U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n (1895) 147
N. Y. 693. In all of these cases the courts placed the burden of proving
performance of the condition on the defendant It may be that in these
cases the wording of the contract tended to confuse the courts, and espe-
cially in the insurance contracts where the words "but if" are often
employed to introduce the condition. In the principal case, however,
there are no misleading words in the agreement and it appears clearly
that the defendant was to be under no duty to reassign to A unless, and
until, the conditions named were performed. The conditions, though
obviously subsequent to the formation of the contract, were clearly
precedent to a right of action in the plaintiff, and were therefore condi-
tions precedent. As such, the court should have placed the burden of
pleading and proving them -on the plaintiff. The true test as to whether
a condition is genuinely precedent or subsequent is: Does the liability of
the defendant arise before or after performance of the condition? If
the former, it is a condition subsequent; if the latter, it is a condition
precedent The practical significance of the distinction is well shown
in an able dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Doe in Kendall v. Brozonson
(1869) 47 N. H. 186, z96. If the burden of proof is on the defendant,
then in a case where the evidence is in equilibrium the defendant loses.
The courts by mistaking a condition precedent for a condition subsequent
may, under the existing rules of pleading, cause a defendant to lose a
decision which he should justly win.
C.M.
CoNTRAcTs-ExcusE FOR NON-PERFORMANcE--WAR AS CONTINGENCY
BEYOND PROMISSOR'S CONTROL.-DucAs v. BAYER Co. (1917) 163 N. Y. S.
32.-In June, 1914, the defendant agreed in writing to deliver to the
plaintiff a certain amount of dyestuffs, stipulating that it should not be
held accountable for delays due to contingencies beyond its control. After
the outbreak of the war which finally cut off the supply, it had on hand,
or received, more than enough goods to fully perform all written con-
tracts. Instead of filling these it made a ratable distribution of the
goods among all its regular customers. Held, that the contingency which
actually caused the non-performance of the contract was not an inade-
quate supply of goods, but the pro rata distribution of such goods as
defendant had.
The present war was held to be no excuse for the failure of a German
firm to deliver to an American firm Belgian antimony according to
agreement. Richards & Co. v. Wreschner (1915) I56 N. Y. S. 1054;
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aff'd. 158 N. Y. S. Ii29. Difficulty of performance, even though unfore-
seen, will not excuse a breach of contract; it must be shown that the
undertaking cannot in any way legally be performed. U. S. v. Gleason
(I9oo) I75 U. S. 588; Lima Locomotive & Machine Co. v. National Steel
Castings Co. (19o7) 155 Fed. 77; Rowe v. Peabody (191i) 2o7 Mass. 226.
This is true even though the difficulty is due to war. Smith v. Morse
(1868) 20 La. Ann. 22o; Elsey v. Stamps (1882) Io Lea (Tenn.) 709;
Jacobs v. Cridit Lyonnais (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 589; Ashmore v. Cox
[1899] I Q. B. D. 436. In the coke and coal business custom seems to
have made a shortage of supplies or shipping facilities an excuse for non-
performance on the part of the seller, provided he delivers a proportional
amount to each of the buyers. Oakman v. Boyce (i868) ioo Mass. 477;
McKeefrey v. Connellsville Coke Co. (1893) 58 Fed. 212; Luhrig Coal
Co. v. Jones & Adams Co. (19o5) 14i Fed. 617. But there must be no
sales to new customers during the period of scarcity. Jessup & Moore
Paper Co. v. Piper (19o2) 133 Fed. io8; Metropolitan Coal Co. v.
Billings (1909) 202 Mass. 457 (dicta in both instances). Even if the
coal dealer has on hand a sufficient supply to fill his contract with the
buyer, he is not bound in times of shortage to deliver to the buyer
the whole amount of his order to the exclusion of other customers. Gar-
field & Procter Coal Co. v. Penn. Coal & Coke Co. (19o8) 199 Mass. 22;
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Billings, supra. More in accord with the prin-
cipal case, it has been held that the fact that a seller cannot supply all his
customers at the same time will not excuse a breach of contract with
any one of them. Emack v. Hughes (19o2) 74 Vt 382;. Seligman v.
Beecher (19o8) 36 Pa. Sup. Ct 475. G. E. W.
CONTRACrs-OFFER--ACCEPTANcE AFTER REASoNABLE TImE.-NAT0iAL
WATCH Co. v. WEISS (1917) 163 N. Y. S. 46.-The defendant, an attorney,
offered by mail to assure payment of a judgment which the plaintiff
had obtained against his client, if the plaintiff would extend the time
of payment sixty days. An acceptance was sent after a reasonable time
had elapsed. There was no reply by the defendant The judgment was
not paid. Held, that the failure by the defendant to reply indicated
acquiescence and that, after the return of the execution against the client
unsatisfied, the defendant was liable.
If the contract were unilateral the act of forbearance by the plaintiff
would be considered adequate acceptance. Strong v. Sheffield (1895) 144
N. Y. 394. Yet the court construed the contract to be bilateral. The
weight of authority in this country seems to be that a contract completed
by acceptance after a reasonable time is void. Ferrier, v. Storer (1884)
63 Ia. 484, 487; Maclay v. Harvey (1878) 90 Ill. 525; Larmon v. Jordan
(187o) 56 Ill. 204. Yet the modern tendency appears to- be that if the
acceptance is made after a reasonable time has elapsed, the offeror must
immediately, upon receipt of the letter of acceptance, notify the offeree
that the offer was withdrawn in order not to be bound. Phillips v.
Moor (i88o) 71 Me. 78; Morrell v. Studd [1913] 2 Ch. 648; Pollock
(1914) 3o LAw QuArT. REV. 4; German Civil Code, sec. 149; Japanese
Civil Code, art 522; Swiss Code of Obligations, sec. 5. F. C. H.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAw-ATTACHING BANK DE-
POSIT OF NON-RESIDENT TO PAY ALIMONY.-PENNINGTON V. FOURTH
NATIONAL BANK OF CINCINNATI (MARCH 6, 1917) U. S. SuP. CT., OCT.
TERM, 1916, No. 47.-The wife of the plaintiff obtained in Ohio a valid
decree of divorce. The plaintiff, being a non-resident, was served by
publication only. In the divorce proceedings the wife, asking for alimony,
joined the defendant bank in which the plaintiff had funds. The court
enjoined the bank from paying out the funds and upon the favorable
termination of the suit for the wife, ordered the defendant to pay over
to her the sum deposited. Later by drawing a check, the plaintiff
demanded the sum from the bank and upon the refusal of payment by
reason of the court's order, claimed that he had been deprived of his
property without due process of law in violation of ihe Fourteenth
Amendment. Held, that the court had the power to appropriate for the
purposes of alimony the plaintiff's personal property situated within the
state.
If the defendant has property within the state, it would be competent to
provide by law for the seizure and appropriation of such property, under
a decree of the court, to the use of the complainant. Cooley, Constitu-
tional Limitations (6th ed.) p. 584. The state through its tribunals may
subject property situated within its limits and owned by non-residents
to the payment of the demands of its own citizens against them. Pen-
noyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714. Where property belonging to the
husband and situated within the state is seized and brought within the
control of the court by attachment or otherwise, constructive service
confers jurisdiction to hold the property seized for the satisfaction of a
judgment for alimony. Twing v. O'Meara (1882) 59 Ia. 326; Wesne v.
O'Brien (1896) 56 Kan. 724. Moreover, a court has jurisdiction through
constructive service even though no property has been seized and placed
within its control and its judgment is valid and enforceable so far as
property within the state can be subjected to its payment. Harshberger
v. Harshberger (1868) 26 Ia. 503. It results that a personal decree for
alimony based on such constructive service is valid against the property
of a non-resident husband which may be found within the jurisdiction
of the court and specifically proceeded against in the divorce proceedings.
Such a decree may be satisfied therefrom as a proceeding in rem. Goore
v. Goore (19O1) 24 Wash. 139; Murray v. Murray (1896) 115 Cal. 266;
Harshberger v. Harshberger, supra.
A. S. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.-MOUNTAIN
TIMBER Co. v. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (MARCH 6, 1917) U. S. SUP.
CT., OcT. TERM, I916, No. 13.-The Workmen's Compensation Act of
Washington, Laws of 1911, p. 345, requires employees in certain hazardous
employments to contribute fixed sums based on their pay rolls to create
a fund to reimburse all employees injured in such employments, without
regard to negligence or common-law liability, and further provides that
no employer shall exempt himself from the burden, or waive the benefits
of the act, by any contract or regulation. Held, that this act was con-
stitutional and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. White, C. J.,
McKenna, Van Devanter and McReynolds, JJ., dissenting.
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The first Workmen's Compensation Act of New York, which was enacted
in 191o, was held unconstitutional because an employer was made liable to
injured employees regardless of the question of fault or negligence on the
part of the employer. Ives v. South Buffalo R. R. Co. (1911) 2O1 N. Y. 271.
But the California court refused to follow the decision in the Ives case
and held the California act constitutional. Western Indemnity v. Pillsbury
(1915) 151 Pac. (Cal.) 398. For a criticism of the Ives case, see 34
L. R A. (N. s.) 162. The later New York act was held constitutional in
a recent case, in which the Supreme Court of the United States said
that the common-law rule confining the employer's liability to cases of
negligence, the defenses of contributory negligence and assumed risks,
are rules of law that were not beyond alteration by the legislature in the
public interest New York Central v. White (March 6, 1917) U. S. $up.
Ct, Oct. Term, i9x6, No. 32o. It has often been declared by the Supreme
Court that no one has a vested interest in the common law. Munn v.
Illinois (1877) 94 U. S. 113, 134; Second Employer's Liability Cases
(1912) 223 U. S. i, 5o. The court in the principal case referred to the
White case in considering the Washington statute and held that the latter
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment in making an employer
liable regardless of fault or negligence. But the Washington act goes
even further than the New York act, requiring the employer to make
enforced contributions, whether injuries have befallen his own employees
or not; in fact his contributions may compensate the injured employees of
his negligent competitors. The state court sustained the law as a valid
exercise of the police power. State v. Clausen (1911) 65 Wash. 156;
Mountain Timber Co. v. State (1913) 75 Wash. 58r. The court held, first,
that the matter of compensation for accidental injuries with a resulting
loss of life or earning capacity was of sufficient public moment to justify
making the entire matter of compensation a public concern, to be admin-
istered through state agencies, Lawton v. Steele (1894) 152 U. S. 133,
136; second, that the tax was not excessive and so not a violation of the
"due process" clause; third, that the burden was fairly distributed. The
taxing feature of the act is very similar to the Oklahoma statute which
levied upon every bank of the state an assessment for the purpose of
creating a guaranty fund to make good the losses of depositors in
insolvent banks. The Oklahoma act was upheld though the fund was
created by a special assessment and not by general taxation. Noble State
Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. io4. For a discussion of the consti-
tutionality of social insurance laws, see Corwin, Social Insurance and
Constitutional Limitations (1917) 26 YAtx LAw JouRNAL, 431.
J. 5.
CpaMINAL LAw-RAPE-CNSENT BY INSAN WOMAN-DEFENDANT'S
IGNORANCE OF INSANITY.-STATE V. H1EIMnMUM (1916) 186 S. W. (Mo.)
696.-The defendant had intercourse with the prosecutrix, a girl of
eighteen who had been feeble-minded since childhood. Prior to that time
he had never seen her. She yielded an apparent consent and there was
nothing in her demeanor from which he had or could have had knowledge
of her mental condition. Held, that in order to convict for rape it was
necessary to show such knowledge in the defendant. Blair, Bond, and
Revelle, JJ., dissenting.
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By analogy to the well settled rule that lack of knowledge of nonage
is no defence, the dissenting judges were of opinion that the defendant's
ignorance of the woman's mental condition was immaterial. A statutory
definition of rape may make it necessary for the man to ascertain at his
peril whether the woman is legally and mentally capable of giving con-
sent. People v. Griffin (1897) 1117 Cal. 583. And it is generally held without
statute that if the woman is so idiotic as to be utterly incapable of
expressing either assent or dissent, the crime is rape. Reg. v. Fletcher
(1859) 8 Cox C. C. 131; Reg. v. Barratt (1873) 12 Cox C. C. 498; Gore
v. State (19O3) iig Ga. 418. The degree of intelligence necessary to
give consent may exist with an impaired and feeble intellect McQuirk
v. State (i887) 84 Ala. 435; Adams v. State (i9ri) 115 Pac. (Okl.) 347;
Morrow v. State (1913) 13 Ga. App. 159. If the woman, though mentally
diseased, yields from mere animal desire, it has been held not to be rape.
Reg. v. Charles Fletcher (1866) io Cox C. C. 248; Reg. v. Connolly
(1867) 26 U. C. Q. B. 317 (semble) ; Baldwin v. State (1883) 15 Tex.
Ct App. 275 (semble). Where the insanity is so marked as to be
palpable, lack of knowledge of the woman's condition can be no defence.
State v. Tarr (I869) 28 Ia. 397. If A aids B and C to commit a rape upon
a woman whom A knows to be mentally incapable of consenting, it is
immaterial whether B and C know her condition or not Caruth v. State
(1894) 25 S. W. (Tex.) 778. In putting the burden upon the state to
prove both the mental incapacity of the apparently consenting woman
and the defendant's knowledge of the fact, the principal case follows
three earlier cases in the same jurisdiction. State v. Cunningham (1889)
IOO Mo. 382; State v. Warren (i9xi) 232 Mo. I85; State v. Schlichter
(1915) 262 Mo. 561. Cf. Beaven v. Commonwealth (895) 17 Ky. L.
Rep. 246.
G. E. W.
EVIDENcE-LoST ACCOUNT BOOKS-PRooF OF CONTENTS.-PERLEY V.
McGRaY (i916) 99 ATL. (ME.) 39.-The plaintiff's original books of
account had been destroyed by fire. A so-called "ledger" which a witness
testified to contain a true copy of all balances on the plaintiff's books was
introduced in evidence to prove the balance due on account from the
defendant Held, that the ledger was admissible.
The general rule is that a book of accounts is admissible in evidence
only when it is a book of original entry. Frick v. Kabaku (i9o2) ii6 Ia.
494; Kerns v. Dean (1888) 77 Cal. 555; Chamberlayne, Modern Law of
Evidence, sec. 3o85. The first permanent record generally constitutes the
original entry. Kansas v. Stephenson (1904) 69 Kan. 405. Accord-
ingly, if the entries are made in a day book and then transferred to a
ledger, the entries in the ledger are not considered original entries and
are not competent. Woodbury v. Woodbury (1876) 50 Vt 152. But
the fact that such entries were made temporarily on rough pieces of paper
or on a slate and then transferred to a book does not destroy the
character of the book as one of original entries. Taylor v. Davis (1892)
82 Wis. 455; Hall v. Glidden (i855) 39 Me. 445. An exception is made
to the general rule where the original books have been lost or destroyed.
The rule allowing secondary evidence of the contents of the entries is
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then applicable and copies of the original which are sworn to as true
are admissible. -odnett v. Gault (ipoi) 64 App. Div. (N. Y.) 163;
Hancock v. Hintrager (1882) 6o Ia. 374. Thus a ledger like any other
copy of original entries becomes competent evidence when the loss or
innocent destruction of the book of original entry is established and a
general balance may be introduced without introducing the separate items.
Rigby v. Logan (i8g9) 45 S. C. 651. If the absence of the original is
unaccounted for, or no explanation is given of its destruction, the copy
is inadmissible. Rouss v. McDowell (i895) 88 Hun, 532; Palmer v.
Goldsmith (1884) 15 Ill. App. 544. In admitting a copy much rests in
the discretion of the trial judge. Stephan v. Metzger (i9o2) 95 Mo. App.
6o9. The principal case is in accord with the prevailing rule and in
harmony with modern business methods.
S. J. T.
MASTER AND SERvAT-NEGLiGENcE-LLILTY OF FATE R SON'S
NEGLIGENcE IN OPERATING PLEASURE CAR.-VAN BLARIcom v. DODGSON
(917) 8 DAIIY RcoRD (N. Y.) 56.The defendant kept a motor car for
pleasure purposes and convenience of his family. His adult son while
operating the car with his father's permission, for his own pleasure and
convenience, negligently drove over the plaintiff's intestate and killed him.
Held, that the defendant was not liable for the negligence of his son
as there was no agency established.
For a discussion of the principles involved in this case, see (i917) 26
YALE LAW JoURNAL, 327.
S. J. T.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WRKMEN'S COMENSATION ACr-INuRY ARis-
ING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT.-WALTHER V. AmImcAN PAPER Co. (igi6) 99
ATL. (N. J.) 263.-A night watchman in a mill, while making his rounds,
was struck over the head and killed by an employee of the same company
who had entered the mill and hid himself without any intent to rob the
office of the mill or to do any other mischief or crime except to rob the
deceased. Held, that the deceased was not killed from an accident
arising out of his employment under Workmen's Compensation Act
(P. L. i91, p. 134). Minturn and Kalisch, JJ., dissenting.
The language of the New Jersey act of 1911 is identical with the
language of the English act of igo6 in that to warrant a recovery an
employee must be injured by "accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment." Bryant v. Fissell (1913) 84 N. J. L. 72. The terms
"out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous. State ex rel.
Duluth Brewing, etc., Co. v. District Ct. (i915) L29 Minn. 176. If either
of these elements is missing, there can be no recovery. McNicol's Case
(1913) 215 Mass. 497. It has been said that under the New Jersey act
an accident which is the result of a risk reasonably incident to the
employment is an accident arising out of the employment. Hulley v.
Moosbrugger (915) 88 N. J. L. i6r. But it is not necessary that it
should be one reasonably to be anticipated as an incident to the employ-
ment. Sponatski's Case (915) 22o Mass. 526. Ordinarily, assault by
third persons cannot be considered as incidental to the employment, but
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where the assault is one which might be reasonably anticipated because
of the general character of the work, or of the particular duties imposed
upon the workmen, injuries resulting therefrom may be found to arise
out of and in the course of the employment. Reithel's Case (1915) 2
Mass. 163 (where the superintendent of a mill was killed while ejecting
a trespasser); Weekes v. Stead (1914) 83 L. J. (K. B.) 1542 (where
a superintendent was assaulted and killed by a man refused work);
Trim Joint Dist. School v. Kelly (1914) 1915A Ann. Cas. (Eng.) 1o4
(where a school master was assaulted and killed by pupils) ; Macfarlane
v. Shaw (igi5) 52 Sc. L. Rep. 236 (where an iron-moulder was assaulted
by a stranger); Thorn v. Humm (1915) 112 L. T. 88 (where a taxicab
driver driving an officer to a fort late at night was shot by a sentry).
In view of these cases it seems that the duties of and circumstances sur-
rounding a night watchman might make such an accident as that in the
principal case the result of a risk reasonably incident to the employment
E. J. M.
STATUTES--"TRIAL MARRIAGE" IN NEW Yoax McCANN v. McCAxN
(1917) 56 N. Y. L. J. 1849.-The plaintiff sued for the annulment of a
marriage on the ground that she was only seventeen years of age when
she married the defendant and had left him before reaching the age of
eighteen, not having cohabited with him since that time. There was born
of the marriage one child which is still living. Held, that under the New
York Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff was entitled to an annulment
of the marriage.
"Trial marriages" in New York are not only permitted but encouraged
under the code. Sec. 1743 provides: "An action may also be maintained
to procure a judgment, declaring a marriage contract void and annulling
the marriage for either of the following causes existing at the time
of the marriage: (i) That one or both of the parties had not attained
the age of legal consent" Sec. 15 of the Domestic Relations Law pro-
vides that where the man is under twenty-one years of age and the
woman under eighteen, written consent of the parents. is necessary before
the issuance of a marriage license. By one section a marriage is abso-
lutely void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent
jurisdiction, if either party thereto is under the age of legal consent.
Kruger v. Kruger (igio) 137 App. Div. (N. Y.) 289. By another section
it is permissible to issue marriage licenses to such persons if their parents
consent. This incongruity should be corrected by the legislature. That
it is in fact "trial marriage" is shown by the number of cases in which
annulment has been granted, though the marriage was with the consent
of the parents and there was cohabitation. Conte v. Conte (19o3) 82
App. Div. (N. Y.) 335; Earl v. Earl (19o4) 96 App. Div. (N. Y.) 639;
Wander v. Wander (igo6) iii App. Div. (N. Y.) i89; Mundell v.
Coster (1913) 8o Misc. (N. Y.) 337. The principal case presents a
practical state of affairs in that there is a child of the "trial marriage."
Quaere, what is the status of the child, and who is liable for its support?
E. J. M.
